flow from but also support this core aim. Second, all six drivers overlap and are pursued concurrently, which paradoxically often contributes to contradictory effects on domestic versus overseas audiences. For instance, more forceful and sharper policies regarding unresolved territorial disputes play well at home (contributing to the objectives of sovereignty and legitimacy) but antagonize neighbors, thereby undermining the objective of seeking regional or global leadership. Similarly, leveraging economic power to extract political concessions will compel other countries to reduce their dependence on the Chinese economy. Building off these inherent contradictions, Gill outlines, in the final chapters, the challenges China faces in pursuit of its global goals and provides policy recommendations for the world outside China. As for the question, What will China do next? Gill predicts that, despite both domestic and international challenges, "Xi will drive a foreign policy that first and foremost seeks to solidify the Party's power—unchallenged, accepted, and respected at home and abroad" (p. 223). In short, China will continue to struggle for what it wants from the world. For those concerned with the broader implications for the international system, Gill envisions that "in the near to medium term, these [China's] pursuits will not mean achieving global supremacy or remaking the world in China's image" (p. 224).

A few features distinguish *Daring to Struggle* from other studies of China's foreign policy. First, it is structured in a refreshingly distinctive way. Gill begins by presenting a coherent framework that captures the complexity of China's foreign policy objectives. The remainder of the book then delves into in-depth analyses of the six objectives. This structure does a superb job of demonstrating to the readers the logic of and tensions among these objectives. Second, Gill skillfully presents his findings in a way that allows readers first to understand the historical context of China's foreign policy associated with each objective leading up to Xi, followed by a comprehensive treatment of how Xi is distinguished from his predecessor in the scope and range of policy initiatives in pursuit of that objective. Third, as Gill acknowledges, this book is intended for a broad audience, academic and otherwise. It fulfills that aim admirably. General readers will find the book balanced, informative, and educational. Academic readers will appreciate the author's granular research and be intrigued by the conceptual framework and cases in support of the arguments. China scholars will find the Notes section particularly useful: it presents a valuable bibliography of recent works, scholarly and nonscholarly, on a wide range of topics related to Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics.

Comprehensive and probing as it is, Gill's book perhaps raises as many questions as it answers, especially for those who study international relations (IR) and foreign policy

analysis (FPA). For instance, Gill does not discuss much about the process through which he derives the six foreign policy drivers. It would be useful to learn how Gill compares and defends his conceptual framework against other models with alterative sets of drivers (p. 226, fn 6). Another question concerns how the five nonlegitimacy drivers are prioritized by Xi's China. As Gill acknowledges, there are tensions among these drivers wherein the pursuit of one often incurs damage to or loss in another. When China implements economic coercion tactics to achieve sovereignty-related objectives, such as in the South China Sea, it risks the immediate and potential future diminishing of economic benefits (associated with the objective of wealth). Therefore, using those tactics implies that sovereignty is valued more than wealth. Some important theoretical and policy-relevant questions flow out of these instances of unequal priorities. For instance, how does China rank order or weight different objectives in cases or initiatives with wide-ranging policy consequences? Are certain objectives (e.g., sovereignty) noncompensatory (i.e., to be achieved at all costs), whereas others (e.g., ideas) are compensatory (i.e., can be substituted for by other objectives)? These questions invite further theorizing and analysis. In the book, Gill depicts Xi Jinping as a leader who is adamant and reluctant to back down despite contravening policy outcomes. That makes many FPA scholars wonder to what extent China's accelerated global outreach is an outcome of historical inevitability or the sheer determination of its current paramount leader. As China returns to the age of strongman politics, how do we distinguish Xi's interests and priorities from those of the CCP as a whole? Or are those distinctions, if any, no longer necessary for understanding today's Chinese politics?

In short, in *Daring to Struggle*, Bates Gill offers a clear, convincing, and accessible guide to understanding what China wants from the world and how it plans to achieve its global goals. It is an important addition to the growing scholarship on China's foreign policy. His analysis and insight will be relevant in the years to come as China continues to struggle on the world stage.

Wicked Problems: The Ethics of Action for Peace, Rights, and Justice. Edited by Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, Douglas Irvin-Erickson, and Ernesto Verdeja. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. 288p. $99.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, Douglas Irvin-Erickson, and Ernesto Verdeja's edited volume *Wicked Problems* sets out to explore the "practical puzzles" or ethical dilemmas and trade-offs in the practice of change-making and peace-building. A wicked problem is a complex challenge

resistant to simple solutions. Attempts to prevent violence or demand justice are wicked problems: any tactic or strategy might create new problems or harms.

The book's three sections focus on wicked questions of violence, leadership and organizations, and systems and institutions. A stunning array of authors write short, punchy chapters that offer a visceral kick in the gut by describing the trade-offs and tensions involved in addressing these problems outside the realm of normative academic posturing. For example, ending a brutal civil war might require giving amnesty to human-rights–abusing officials. Pinned between the rock of autocracy and the cliff of vast economic inequality, do change-makers accept a step toward change with promised elections, or do they hold out for more radical change? Should nonviolent activists focus on building the future they desire or confront the urgent harms occurring in the present? Does ending police violence in the United States begin with a too-timid police reform bill that brings only limited change, or would a failure to pass any new legislation be worse? And what might be the outcome of a full-out armed Black resistance to police brutality? Each of the paths toward change is problematic. What ethical frameworks do we use to make decisions?

The book distinguishes itself in several ways from other attempts to answer these questions. Although most other books emphasize the state-centric goals of stability or law and order, most of this volume's authors are firmly rooted in social-justice–oriented peacebuilding and are critical of state power. There is no real debate among the authors on whether a social justice agenda is necessary. These authors agree that unjust political, economic, and social systems are the root harms that give rise to war and repressive violence. Conflict to provoke social change is necessary.

Although most books on change-making focus on the present, the ghosts of colonialism, slavery, and the layered matrix of oppression rooted in centuries of white supremacy, patriarchy, and vulture capitalism haunt the pages of this book. Without apology, the book's contributors widely agree that building a just peace requires negotiating with these ghosts and healing intergenerational harms that play out in the present.

Most of the chapters provide vivid examples of ethical dilemmas in practice, not in abstraction. Change-making relies on normative values. Yet rarely do books provide the gritty context where change-making requires sacrificing one value in pursuit of another. Peacebuilding from afar seems far simpler than the gut-wrenching choices that must be made in critical moments.

Another of the volume's distinctions is its breaking down of the strange focus in most peacebuilding books on "conflict-affected countries" in Asia, Latin America, and Africa while excluding Europe and North America. The rise of autocratic regimes in Western countries favoring explicit white supremacist goals has surfaced a tension that most white liberal peacebuilders have been reluctant to acknowledge. Many of the contributors discuss recent revelations among white Western change-makers who finally had to confront the troublesome legacy of colonialism and slavery and the pressing crises of police violence.

Revolutionary violence is out of fashion in most social-change circles. Yet this book includes a provocative chapter by Tony Gaskew, former police officer and dedicated advocate of Black armed resistance. Rightly critical of white liberals preaching about peace while accepting widespread injustice, Gaskew points to statements from both Gandhi and King that resisting injustice is necessary, even if it requires violence. Injustice is the evil, not violence. Sounding a lot like a modern-day Frantz Fanon, Gaskew argues both that violence is the only language the white supremacist system understands, *and* it is a necessary ritual to rehumanize Black communities. The "only language" argument is then paired with broad pronouncements that only violence is an effective antidote to white supremacy. Gaskew even seems to suggest that Malcolm X was too weak when he argued change should take place "by any means necessary." In Gaskew's view, nonviolence *never* works. Chapters like this one do not often find their way into books wrestling with the ethics of social change.

Although Gaskew offers a valid denunciation of white liberals' preference for a slow, reformist pace of change, he does not provide evidence or examples of where radical Black resistance worked (Cuba? DRC?). The reader is reminded of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan's research demonstrating through analysis of hundreds of cases that violent change fails twice as often as nonviolent social movements; this research is cited by the editors themselves and several of the other chapter authors. Without referencing intersectionality or patriarchy, Gaskew nevertheless criticizes the mostly women-led Movement for Black Lives while not addressing the evidence that nonviolent movements enable a larger number of people to participate, including people unwilling or unable to hold a gun.

Although other books examine ethics in change-making, this one stands out in the diversity of the contributors' backgrounds, experiences, and assumptions about change-making. Rooted in decolonial literature and commitments, the section of the book on leadership and organizations provides critical reflections on the challenges of taking on white supremacy. For example, a chapter by Minh Dang on the paradox of survivor leadership in an organization focused on human trafficking offers clear examples and definitions of tokenization and pedestalization when other change advocates single out a special representative to speak for a minority or victim group while erasing the diversity and complexity within these groups.

In contrast to most edited volumes, the chapter authors make a solid attempt to refer to each other's work and cross-reference themes. The editors, from their position in

US-based institutions, make room for many voices and find the common themes that weave the book into a cohesive whole. Still, as discussed in the volume, sometimes even the most well-intentioned attempts to design for inclusion only highlight who has been left out.

This book may be especially helpful for those who have a passion for justice but have not experienced the pangs of idealism meeting reality. I will be using it in my classes to introduce students to the field of change-making and the concept of wicked problems. Change-making is neither simple nor quick. It is not pure, and one thing is for sure: no one's hands are clean in the end. Although libraries accrue many books on ethics related to violence and social change, this volume does not have any real competitors in terms of offering readers a humbling taste of the dilemmas of change-making.

Governing Abroad: Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy in Europe. By Sibel Oktay. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 254p. $80.00 cloth, $32.95 paper.
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Why are some coalition governments able to push through ambitious foreign policy agendas, while others struggle and offer only timid steps? Sibel Oktay's new book *Governing Abroad*, building on both quantitative and qualitative scholarship, offers a nuanced yet persuasive answer—coalition governments' ability to push through ambitious foreign policy depends on whether the government holds a majority (and how big that majority is), whether it is internally divided, and whether it is able to coopt (or buy off) the opposition. Importantly, Oktay's book demonstrates that having a minority government is not necessarily fatal to foreign policy ambition, and that having a comfortable majority is not a guarantee of decisive action abroad. Ultimately, success in advancing a foreign policy agenda depends on the particular domestic constellation of the government in question.

The primary contribution of Oktay's book lies in bringing the comparative politics scholarship on coalition politics to the broad field of foreign policy analysis. She develops a theoretically rigorous and nuanced model, which explains variation in foreign policy action by coalition government. This in itself is a major contribution, as coalition governments are ubiquitous in Europe, and have led a majority of European countries for a majority of their post-World War II history. To support her model, Oktay employs advanced quantitative methods and conducts three in-depth qualitative case studies. These case studies offer insight into decisions of the Danish and Dutch governments to join the war in Iraq, and Finland's decision to join the Eurozone.

The crux of Oktay's argument builds on two theories— *veto player* and *clarity of responsibility* theory. In principle, these theories have contradictory expectations. Whereas veto player theory would predict that coalition governments—especially as they get larger—would have difficulties executing bold foreign policy action because of the large number of veto players; clarity of responsibility theory would predict that larger coalition governments are able to diffuse the responsibility for foreign policy action (particularly if it is unpopular) and are hence able to pursue bold action abroad. Oktay's answer to this contradiction lies in the ideological distance between the parties in the coalition (the smaller, the easier to pursue action), and the ability of the coalition to logroll the opposition (by offering what rationalist scholars would call "side payments"). The book persuasively shows that smaller government parties often do not pull the plug on the coalition *even if* they disagree with the proposed foreign policy action because they are interested in being a member of a coalition. By contrast, even large coalition parties might be prevented from pursuing foreign policy action if they try to woo other parties to join the coalition.

While systematic scholarly attention to the domestic sources of foreign policy is one of the major trends and advances in the fields of international relations and foreign policy analysis, even in what has become in recent years a fairly crowded field, Oktay manages to carve out a niche. The systematic look at the coalition size and ideological variation among coalitional parties offers a genuinely new contribution to the scholarship and advances the field of foreign policy analysis further.

Oktay tests this theory using quantitative and qualitative analysis. Both analyses complement one another, and reflect the universe of cases, which are the European coalition governments between 1990 and 2004. The quantitative analysis builds on the analysis of the events data using multilevel modelling based on coalition size and ideological distance, as well as a host of control variables. This analysis shows that in minimum-winning coalitions, the predicted international commitment does not vary as the ideological dispersion increases, showing that minimum-winning coalitions have "dampening effect on commitment behavior" (p. 77). By contrast, oversized coalitions "lose their assertive foreign policy edge at high levels of dispersion" (p. 77). Oktay then proceeds to test these findings on three case studies – Denmark's minority government's decision to join the 1990 and 2003 wars in Iraq; the Dutch government's minimum-winning coalition's halting attempts to join the 2003 war in Iraq; and Finland's oversized coalition's decision to join the Eurozone. These case studies build extensively on newspaper articles, media reports, and secondary literature published in English. They persuasively show that the mechanisms theorized by Oktay are indeed at play.

As with any excellent scholarly work, this book leaves some questions unanswered. The first set of questions is